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Keynote Address
Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a
Bekins Extrapolation Too Far*
HON. THOMAS B. BENNETT**
Today, consent is a topic of much debate in the bankruptcy realm, as
is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent and upcoming considerations
of the ability of private parties to consent to a bankruptcy judge’s
adjudication of matters that without consent, may necessitate determination
by a federal judge having lifetime tenure. Though some of what is to be
presented has application to this context, it is not the subject for
consideration here. Rather, it is the scope, blips, and blemishes that swirl
around one sovereign’s consent to jurisdiction over a part of it, a
subdivision of a state, by another sovereign, the United States. More
precisely, it is whether the perceived scope of consent to a federal court’s
bankruptcy jurisdiction over a state’s municipal subdivision is correct. A
number of reported decisions of bankruptcy courts, and even more legal
articles, espouse the idea that once a state authorizes—that is, consents—to
the filing of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case by one of its municipalities,
neither the state, the municipality, nor anyone else may reject the use of
any parts of Chapter 9 along the road to readjustment of debts.
To view the scope of consent, a structural framework must be
recalled. It is the relationship of the states to the United States under the
Constitution, which is often referred to as federalism, and involves the
interplay of how dual sovereigns have allocated, reserved, and, yes, ceded,
powers. Remember that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
came first. Rather, it was the Articles of Confederation, which vested very
little power in what we view now as the Executive Branch of our
government. Instead, Congress held the most power under a structure that
retained in the hands of the thirteen colonies many of the critical powers
necessary for an effective central government.
* This is a lightly footnoted adaptation of the Keynote Address that was delivered on
October 17, 2014, for the Campbell Law Review’s Symposium, “One City at a Time: The
Role and Increasing Presence of Municipal Bankruptcies.”
** Chief Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Alabama.
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Experiencing the failings of such a structure initiated the process that
led to enactment of the Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights. Among
other things, the Constitution is a ceding of powers held by the state
sovereigns to a central government. Some are absolutely given up, and
others are given up only upon the federal government’s exercise of powers
granted to it by the various states through the Constitution. One that is
given up only on the United States’ exercise of its constitutional grant is
that for the provision of uniform laws on bankruptcy.
What was a serious afterthought to the Constitution is the Bill of
Rights, and for our purposes, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the
states or to the people, the “powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states.1 It is the evolving,
dynamic interplay of what is reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment with that which is ceded or allocated to the central
government, along with what is denied to the states under the Constitution
that is the structure that must be dissected to have some idea of what may
be the boundary of consent of a state to one of its parts being subjected to
the federal government’s exercise of its Bankruptcy Clause powers.
The structure is the Constitution, but to understand how broad or
limited the impact of a state’s consent to the filing of a municipal
bankruptcy is, the details of the framing need consideration. These details
include: (1) the Supreme Court’s rationale for striking down the 1934
municipal bankruptcy law,2 along with its reasoning for upholding the 1937
Act;3 (2) the structure of the first, second, and current municipal
bankruptcy laws—the 1934 enactment,4 the 1937 statute,5 and today’s
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code;6 (3) the Tenth Amendment;7 (4) the
Contract Clause8 and its prohibition on state impairment of contracts; (5)
the Bankruptcy Clause, the Taxation Clause, and the Commerce Clause, all
of which are contained in Article 1, Section Eight, of the Constitution;9 and

1. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936)
(invalidating the 1934 Act).
3. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (upholding the 1937 Act).
4. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton,
298 U.S. 513.
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 401–404, amended by Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90
Stat. 315 (current version codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
9. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 (Taxation Clause), 3 (Commerce Clause), 4 (Bankruptcy
Clause).
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(6) the shifting dichotomy regarding the ability of the United States to
exercise the powers accorded to it, and the limits on its exercise of those
powers on states as revealed—some may say muddled—by Supreme Court
decisions.
What will not be considered other than briefly is the issue of
immunity, including sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.
This is because the view regarding consent considered here has developed
through case law that did not rely on immunity in its various forms or on
the Eleventh Amendment. This case authority was premised solely on the
interaction of the Tenth Amendment with the Bankruptcy Clause powers
accorded to the United States.
Although not the focus of the analysis presented, there will be a
discussion of immunity, including sovereign immunity, and to the extent
used in cases to be mentioned on this topic, the Eleventh Amendment.
However, this portion of the presentation deals with what are further
complexities in determining the environs of consent of a state to imposition
of federal power on it or a subdivision.
These are the framing materials with which one must work. It is by
consideration of these that one learns of the blips and blemishes of and to
consent. As the review and analysis progresses, all that I request is that any
preconceived views on what is the perimeter of consent be set to one side.
I.
A.

CONSENT: THE ASHTON VIEW AND ITS BEKINS REVISITATION

Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 110

Perhaps the easiest entry into this consent discussion is to outline the
abrupt shift in the position of the Supreme Court from that used to reject
the first municipal bankruptcy law. This shift occurred within a span of
just under two years, from May 1936 to April 1938.
The rejection of consent as a basis on which the federal government
could exercise its Bankruptcy Clause powers to enable subdivisions of a
state to file a case under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 occurred in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1.11 The statute under
consideration was the 1934 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, which
added the first municipal bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court recognized
that the law only allowed voluntary municipal bankruptcies. The Court
described the contents of portions of the three sections comprising the 1934
Act, including quoting one provision that prevented impairment of or
10. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
11. Id.
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limitation on a state’s powers to control a municipality in the exercise of its
political or governmental powers, and another part that restrained the
bankruptcy court’s exercise of its powers and jurisdiction over the political
and governmental powers of the municipality, including the use and
enjoyment of its revenues, properties, and expenditures. Nonetheless, the
Court determined that it “need not consider this act in detail or undertake
definitely to classify it.”12 In other words, the analysis was not done with
reference to specific provisions of the 1934 Act.
Rather, the Court in Ashton focused on the dual sovereignty of our
federal structure. It analogized the Supreme Court’s taxation case law
holdings that the federal government could not tax certain aspects of a
state’s exercise of its retained sovereign powers as being the same sort of
prohibited conduct as the imposition of the federal bankruptcy powers on
municipalities. This determination overlooked and did not mention its
contrary case law on taxation that was cited in Justice Cardozo’s dissent,13
in which consent by one sovereign to taxation of activities of another had
been upheld.
Additionally, the Ashton Court looked at the 1934 Act as allowing the
states to do what they could not do directly: impair contracts. It read the
1934 Act as allowing the states to indirectly impair contracts and, as a
result, the Court viewed the Act as allowing an impermissible activity by a
state under the Contract Clause. With respect to consent to the exercise of
the Bankruptcy Clause powers, the Court said that “[n]either consent nor
submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress.”14 Thus, a
state’s authorization for the filing of a bankruptcy case by a municipality
did not solve what the Supreme Court then viewed as the inability of the
federal government to expand its grant of powers under the Constitution
over the retained sovereign rights of states by the simple expedient of
consent. Nor could consent be the basis under the Bankruptcy Clause to
enable states to do indirectly what the Constitution prohibited states to do:
impair contracts. One other point is that the Tenth Amendment
determination made in Ashton was done without analytical consideration of
whether the specifics of what was in the 1934 Act transgressed the
demarcations set by the Tenth Amendment.

12. Id. at 527.
13. Id. at 538–39 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 531 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
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United States v. Bekins15

Quickly after the Ashton ruling, the second municipal bankruptcy law
was enacted,16 and it was just as swiftly attacked as unconstitutional. By
April of 1938, the Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins determined
that the 1937 Act was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s Bankruptcy
Clause powers.17 The Court looked at the contents of the four sections that
made up this law, in conjunction with its revised view on consent by a
state.
In Bekins, unlike in the Ashton decision, the Supreme Court gave
detailed attention to the contents of the statute. One point was that only a
voluntary bankruptcy petition could be filed. Another was that this law
involved compositions that the Court had determined in earlier decisions to
be within the Bankruptcy Clause powers of Congress. A third was
rejection of the Ashton concept, that use of the Bankruptcy Clause powers
enabled states to indirectly impair contracts in contravention of the
Contract Clause. The Bekins Court reiterated that the Contract Clause did
not bar the United States from impairing contracts, which is what had
occurred under the 1937 Act. Thus, no state impairment of contracts was
involved.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court revised its view on consent in
Bekins. The Court reviewed its prior precedent regarding consent between
two sovereigns and concluded that consent by one sovereign to the
otherwise impermissible taking of an action by another, such as taxing or
contracting, was not in derogation of sovereignty. Rather, it was “the
essence of sovereignty to be able to . . . give consents bearing upon the
exertion of governmental power.”18 The Court also determined that the
Tenth Amendment protected and did not destroy the right of states to give
consent where the action consented to would not contravene the provisions
of the Constitution. The Bekins ruling was purely anchored in the Tenth
Amendment without consideration of the case-law-based doctrines of
immunity, including intergovernmental immunity, or the Eleventh
Amendment.
In conjunction with this revised view on consent, the Court also
considered specific aspects of the structure of the 1937 Act. These
considerations included the necessity of state authorization for such a
filing, the requirement that state law authorize all actions that are necessary
to carry out the composition, the degree of prebankruptcy agreement by
15.
16.
17.
18.

United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653.
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 37.
Id. at 51–52.
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affected creditors that was mandated, along with the confirmation requisite
of two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected claims for approval of the
plan, and two subsections that limited application of the Bankruptcy Clause
powers to a state’s exercise of its political and governmental powers and
the powers and jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court over the municipal
debtor. These two subsections are the forerunners of what is in §§ 903 and
904 of the current Bankruptcy Code.19
Based on these factors, the Bekins Court determined that the 1937 Act
was carefully crafted to not impinge on state sovereignty, that the state
retains control over its political, governmental, and fiscal affairs, and the
filing of the case and approval of the plan are authorized by state law,
approved by the bankruptcy court, and agreed upon by the municipality.20
From this context, it viewed consent as one where the essence of
statehood, its sovereignty, is maintained without impairment.21 Put
differently, and in the economic climate of the late 1930s, it enabled the
states to achieve the readjustment of debts of insolvent municipalities that
the states could not do on their own due, in part, to the predominant view
since Sturges v. Crowninshield22 that the Contract Clause prohibits
impairment of contracts by states.23 It is an instance whereby granting
consent to the intervention of the federal government’s exercise of the
Bankruptcy Clause powers over state subdivisions, “[t]he State acts in aid,
not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It invites the intervention of the
bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State is powerless to
rescue.”24
Important in the upholding of the 1937 Act in Bekins was this
revisited view on state consent. It was one that expressly looked at the
structure of how the 1937 Act was crafted to ensure that its structure did
not impair what the Court perceived as the essence of sovereignty. More
simply put, and unlike in the Ashton decision, what was in the 1937 Act
was critical to the determination that the consent given by the states did not
impair their essential sovereign powers.
Despite Ashton and Bekins being alike in the sense that both rulings
were founded purely on the Tenth Amendment, there was a difference in
the Court’s analytical approach. In Bekins, the Supreme Court reviewed
the contents of the 1937 Act to ascertain that its grasp did not extend into

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (2012).
Id. at 37.
Id. (emphasis added).
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
Id. at 207.
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/2

6

Bennett: Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins Extrapolation

2015]

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

9

the powers of states protected by the Tenth Amendment. The analysis was
done in two steps. First was the determination of whether the Tenth
Amendment barred consent by a state to what would otherwise have been
an impermissible application of the Bankruptcy Clause powers on a state’s
municipal subdivisions.25 Second, the Court had to confirm that the
provisions of the 1937 Act did not exceed the limits imposed by the Tenth
Amendment.26
Bekins clearly stands for the constitutional ability of a state to consent
to the United States’ exercise of its Bankruptcy Clause powers by
expanding its bankruptcy laws to embrace a state’s municipal subdivisions,
so long as the manner of the embrace does not impair the essential aspects
of state sovereignty. This is a far different and more greatly limited
holding than is embodied in the views of many today, that consent to the
filing of a municipal bankruptcy is tantamount to a state’s or others’
inability to successfully object to application of any of the provisions that
are now in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. To fully understand this
view requires knowing what was in the 1934 and 1937 Acts compared to
today’s Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE COMPARISONS: CHAPTER IX OF THE 1934 ACT, CHAPTER X OF
THE 1937 ACT, AND CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Next in the consideration of the scope of consent is outlining the
contents of the failed 1934 Act, and then the 1937 Act, which survived
constitutional scrutiny. The 1934 Act27 was three sections long, and only
one of the sections, section 80,28 contained subsections. One of the
sections, section 78,29 dealt with the policy underlying the enactment of a
municipal bankruptcy law. A second, section 79,30 contained the
jurisdictional grant for municipal bankruptcies. The last, section 80,31
constituted the provisions detailing the how, where, and when that a
municipality may file for bankruptcy, have a plan of readjustment of debts
confirmed, and exit from bankruptcy. Moreover, section 80 delineates the
necessity of having the plan of adjustment filed with the bankruptcy
petition, along with a statement that, depending on the type of municipal
25. Id. at 52.
26. Id. at 53.
27. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton v.
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
28. Id. § 80, 48 Stat. at 798–803.
29. Id. § 79, 48 Stat. at 798.
30. Id. § 78, 48 Stat. at 798.
31. Id. § 80(a), 48 Stat. at 798–99.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2

10

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

entity, no less than either 30% or 51% in the aggregate amount of claims of
certain creditors affected by the plan had approved it.32 Essentially, it is a
filing requirement that one have a degree of pre-filing approval of the plan
of adjustment.33 For confirmation, the requisite amount of affected claims
by class of creditor and the requisite amount of all claims of all classes of
creditors approving the plan was required and varied by municipal entity
from 66 % to 75%.34
In addition to this confirmation requirement, others that are the same
or similar to the current provisions of § 943 of the Bankruptcy Code needed
to be met. However, there is one significant difference between the
contents of Chapter IX of the 1934 Act and the current Chapter 9.
Chapter IX was almost wholly self-contained. By this, I mean that
with two exceptions, no other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were
incorporated as part of the 1934 Act. The two exceptions were § 93(h)35
for determining the extent of a creditor’s secured status, and § 2936
regarding certain stays of actions. Other than these two exceptions, the
requirements for entry into, through, and exiting from Chapter IX were
governed solely by the eleven subsections of section 80.37 The precursor to
§ 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, section 80(k)38 of the 1934 Act, limited the
ability of the municipal bankruptcy laws to “limit or impair the power of
any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision
thereof in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including
expenditures therefor.”39
Similarly, the earliest version of the restrictions on the jurisdiction and
powers of a bankruptcy court was set forth in section 80(c)(11).40 This
subsection limited the powers of a bankruptcy judge by specifying that the
judge “shall not, by any order or decree, in the proceeding or otherwise,
interfere with (a) any of the political or governmental powers of the taxing
district, or (b) any of the property or revenues of the taxing district
necessary in the opinion of the judge for essential governmental purposes,
or (c) any income-producing property, unless the plan of readjustment so
provides.”41
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 80(b), 48 Stat. at 799.
Id. § 80(c), 48 Stat. at 800.
Id. § 80(d), 48 Stat. at 801.
11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), (b) (2012).
Id. § 108.
Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 §§ 80(a)–(l), 48 Stat. at 798–803.
Id. § 80(k), 48 Stat. at 802.
Id.
Id. § 80(c)(11), 48 Stat. at 801.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Although very similar—some may say identical, in large parts—the
1937 Act42 had slight, but subtle differences. The second municipal
bankruptcy law was composed of four sections. Only one of these four
sections, section 83,43 contained subparts. Two of the sections, sections
8144 and 84,45 dealt with jurisdiction. Section 81 was the grant of
jurisdiction, and section 84 set its termination. Section 8246 set forth four
definitions for Chapter X, which was later redenominated as Chapter IX.
In nine subsections, section 8347 set forth the how, when, and where the
municipal-bankruptcy process begins and the how to get through and out of
Chapter IX. Its process for entry through exiting was very similar to that of
the 1934 Act.
One difference from both the 1934 Act and today’s Chapter 9 is that
the 1937 Act was completely self-contained. There were no references to
or inclusions from other sections of the Bankruptcy Act contained within
the 1937 Act. In fact, the language is explicit regarding a host of matters
from the requirements for the filing of the petition, to challenging the
filing, to the components of the plan of composition, to confirmation, and
to exiting from Chapter IX: all are evaluated on compliance with the
provisions of “this chapter,” not other parts of the Bankruptcy Act outside
of Chapter IX.
Although the filing requirement of having the approval in writing of
the requisite number in dollar amount of creditors affected by the plan of
composition remained part of the municipal bankruptcy law, it is altered
from the 1934 Act by merging what had been two categories of municipal
debtors into one, and by having only one applicable prebankruptcy written
approval standard: not less than 51% in dollar amount of the aggregate of
all claims of creditors affected by the plan regardless of the type of claim.
The confirmation requirement was also altered so that it had one
acceptance standard for confirmation: by at least two-thirds of the
aggregate amount of all classes of allowed claims affected by the plan the
overwhelming majority of which was required to have been obtained
before the filing of the municipal bankruptcy case.48 This version of
Chapter IX was designed to be essentially a prepackaged plan.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653.
Id. § 83, 50 Stat. at 655.
Id. § 81, 50 Stat. at 654.
Id. § 84, 50 Stat. at 659.
Id. § 82, 50 Stat. at 654.
Id. § 83, 50 Stat. at 655–59.
Id. § 83(a), 50 Stat. at 655.
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The two most noteworthy alterations in the 1937 Act are those made
to what had been in the subsections dealing with the restrictions on the
ability of Chapter 9 to limit or impair a state’s political or governmental
powers to control the municipal debtor, and those restrictions on the
powers of a bankruptcy court by any order or decree founded on
bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law to interfere with the municipal debtor’s
political or governmental powers, its property or revenues, or its incomeproducing properties. The modification to the provision designed to retain
the legislatively perceived proper amount of state control over the
municipal debtor was to clarify the protection of state powers from the
1934 Act’s section 80(k) “any political subdivision thereof”49 to being “any
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State”50 in section
83(i) of the 1937 Act.
The far more important alteration was the expansion of the limits on a
bankruptcy court’s powers by the wording of section 83(c), which deleted
only six words from the 1934 Act: “in the opinion of the judge,” regarding
the inability of the bankruptcy court, absent the consent of the municipality
in its plan, to interfere with its property or revenues “necessary for essential
governmental purposes.”51 More simply, this deletion eliminated any
discretion that a bankruptcy judge may have had under the statute to
determine if a municipality’s use of properties or revenues was truly
necessary for essential governmental purposes. The elimination of these
six words, along with the 1976 deletion of the phrase “necessary for
essential governmental purposes,” have been carried forward into what is
now in § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code.52
The absence of provisions from both the 1934 and 1937 Acts, which
are parts of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, is another component in the
consideration of the scope of consent by a state to its subdivisions’ filing of
a bankruptcy case. From 1937 until 1976, little of Chapter IX changed
with respect to its self-contained structure. However, and as is often the
case, the specter of large—in size and complexity—municipal bankruptcies
caused a change. The impetus for Congress to revisit how Chapter IX
worked arose from the fear of an impending filing of bankruptcy by large
cities and the belief that the existing simple, four-section, self-contained
structure was unworkable for such large and complex potential filings.
Beginning with amendments in 1976 to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy

49.
50.
51.
52.

Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 § 80(k), 48 Stat. at 802.
Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(i), 50 Stat. at 659.
Id. § 83(c), 50 Stat. at 659.
11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
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Act,53 the self-contained structure came to an end. Various aspects of
powers available in corporate and individual bankruptcy cases were added
to those powers that were utilizable by municipal debtors. This process of
incorporating aspects of other bankruptcy chapters into the municipal
bankruptcy chapter continued into and after the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Today, twenty sections are contained within Chapter 9, many of which
have multiple subsections. Added to these sections is incorporation into
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code of parts of or all of fifty-four sections
via § 901(a).54 Another twelve sections are added to Chapter 9 by § 103(f),
which states that “[e]xcept as provided in § 901 of this title, only chapters 1
and 9 of this title apply in a case under such Chapter 9.”55
The subject matter of these eighty-six sections or parts of sections is
varied and ranges from what is innocuous to those which are of
significance when it comes to analyzing the view of the impact and scope
of consent that many bankruptcy courts perceive it to be. Included in this
range of provisions are appointment of a healthcare ombudsman, immunity
from criminal prosecution for persons required to provide information in a
bankruptcy case, unclaimed-property distribution, the impact of dismissal
of a case, assumption or rejection of executory contracts, reopening of a
case, disposition of patient records, adequate protection of an interest in
property, the automatic stay, obtaining secured credit, termination and
retention of utility services, sections regarding creditors and their claims,
others regulating debtor duties and benefits, yet more on the subject of
obtaining and retaining property of a municipal debtor, and various and
sundry sections dealing with the administration and reorganization of a
debtor that are located in Chapter 11.
A couple of examples point out the extrapolation too far of the Bekins
ruling on consent. One section that is external to, but incorporated into
Chapter 9 that is a blip is § 301(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifies
that the commencement of a voluntary case constitutes an order for relief
under the chapter in which it is filed.56 However, § 921(d) specifies that if
a Chapter 9 petition is not dismissed for failure of the municipality to
comply with the prerequisites to filing or is not dismissed based on a badfaith filing, the court “shall order relief under this chapter notwithstanding
§ 301(b).”57 Was the inclusion of § 301(b) warranted or necessary? No.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315.
11 U.S.C. § 901(a).
Id. § 103.
Id. § 301(b).
Id. § 921(d).
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Moreover, it has no impact on a state’s sovereignty beyond what the Bekins
court determined to be permissible.
At the other end of the spectrum of importance are certain sections
brought into Chapter 9 by § 901(a).58 One is the waiver of sovereign
immunity in § 106.59 It applies to a litany of sections within Chapter 9 and
those brought into Chapter 9 via §§ 103(f) and 901(a). The § 901(a)
importing includes a waiver of sovereign immunity for thirty sections or
parts thereof listed in § 106(a) that are brought into Chapter 9 via either
§§ 103(f) or 901(a). At this time, no case law has considered how
§ 106(a)’s “[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set
forth in this Section,”60 that is, its waiver of sovereign immunity, interacts
with either § 903’s limit or restriction on impairment of the power of states
to control their municipalities or § 904’s limits on the jurisdiction and
powers of a bankruptcy court. More importantly, no reported opinion
addresses the Tenth Amendment’s constraints on it in the context of a
bankrupt municipality. This is a large blemish. Particularly disquieting for
the current view of consent fostered by some is that other than the Bekins
view of consent from a Tenth Amendment prism, no issue regarding waiver
of sovereign immunity was—indeed by Chapter IX’s self-contained nature
could not have been—considered as part of the Supreme Court’s upholding
of the 1937 Act.
Equally troublesome is that the incorporation of the waiver of
sovereign immunity by § 901(a) is reciprocated by § 106(a)’s listing of
§ 901 as a section of the Bankruptcy Code for which its waiver of
immunity applies. This creates a conundrum and reveals a further blemish
in the position espoused by those who assert that once a state consents to its
municipality filing a Chapter 9, all of that which is in Chapter 9 has been
consented to apply.
Consider that § 901(a) lists fifty-four sections or parts of sections
outside of Chapter 9 that are brought by it into Chapter 9.61 Thirty-two of
these sections are not mentioned in § 106(a)’s listing of sections of the
Bankruptcy Code to which its waiver of sovereign immunity applies. Yet
§ 106(a) specifies that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to
§ 901(a), which is a subsection that only lists other parts of the Bankruptcy
Code brought into Chapter 9.62 The difficulty is that the structure of these

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 901(a).
Id. § 106(a).
Id.
Id. § 901(a).
Id. § 106(a).
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two sections and how they may be interpreted allows one to argue that the
waiver of § 106(a) has been expanded by how § 901 is dealt with by
§ 106(a). This is not a blip. It, too, is a blemish in the currently articulated
belief that consent to a municipal bankruptcy filing by a state is consent to
application of all that is within Chapter 9 to either the state or its municipal
subdivision.
In a similar vein, another example is § 926’s allowance of the
appointment of a trustee to exercise certain avoidance powers should a
municipal debtor elect not to pursue them.63 Yet §§ 903 and 904 purport to
preclude certain interferences with how a state or a municipality uses its
expenditures, revenues, and properties. Even if one can rationalize the
workings of § 926 with those of §§ 903 and 904, § 926’s use of a trustee to
obtain back expenditures, revenues, or properties from or of a state or
municipality is of questionable value when one understands that under
§ 904, a municipality need simply return the expenditure, revenue, or
property to the entity from which they were recovered! Furthermore, one
must pay attention to the fact that §§ 903 and 904, as did their lineal
predecessors, reflect Congress’s view on what are the aspects of state
sovereignty that may not, absent consent, be imposed under the Bankruptcy
Clause. This is not necessarily the same view as that contained within the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment.
Far more serious, though, is § 106(a)’s express waiver of sovereign
immunity of a state, municipality, and other governmental units for
purposes of § 926’s appointment of a trustee to exercise the avoidance
powers that the municipal debtor determines not to exercise. The interplay
of §§ 903 and 904, and more significantly, the Tenth Amendment, are
simply ignored by the statute as drafted. Does this waiver trump either or
both of the provisions of § 903 or § 904? Even if it does, it cannot
overcome the Tenth Amendment, should the waiver or § 926 transgress the
boundary set by it. Again, a blemish exists in the position taken by some
that the consent to file under Chapter 9 means that a state or its
municipality has consented to all that is within Chapter 9.
These are but a few examples of sections within Chapter 9 and
brought into Chapter 9 via §§ 103(f) and 901(a) that were never part of
either the 1934 or 1937 Acts, and that impact in various ways a state’s
sovereignty beyond those that were reviewed by the Supreme Court in
Bekins. Others exist. The impact of the fact that none of these were, nor
could they have been, considered by the Supreme Court in Bekins has never
been addressed in any reported decision that indicates that a state’s consent

63. Id. § 926.
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to bankruptcy jurisdiction for its subdivisions equates to consent by either
the state or its subdivision to application of all that is today’s Chapter 9.
The scope of consent considered by the Supreme Court when it struck
down the 1934 Act and upheld the 1937 Act was done in the context of
statutes that did not have a part of the municipal bankruptcy law’s
numerous sections currently encapsulated into Chapter 9. The consent
discussions by the Court in both Ashton and Bekins were done in the
context of far less of a statutory reach than what exists in Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. This is one more major distinction that is not considered
by the current view of consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction equating to the
waiver of challenges to using all parts of the Bankruptcy Code in or
brought into Chapter 9.
III. THE MISSION INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT PROGENY
Further demonstrating that this aspect of the analytical framework of
Bekins has been overlooked is revealed by deciphering the cases upon
which rests the theorem that consent to bankruptcy by a state for its
municipality is consent to all that is within the current version of Chapter 9.
The source of this view of consent is sometimes disclosed as a 1940
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Mission Independent School District v. Texas.64 What followed in 1989
was In re Sanitary & Improvement District, No. 7,65 some forty-nine years
and a significantly different law later. Then in 1992 came In re City of
Columbia Falls, Special Improvement District No. 25,66 followed by In re
County of Orange in two opinions, one in 199567 and the other in 1996,68 In
re City of Vallejo69 (2009), In re Jefferson County70 (2012), In re City of
Stockton71 (2012), and In re City of Detroit72 (2013). Each of the courts in
Vallejo, Stockton, Detroit, and yes, that judge in Jefferson County,
effectively adopted what had been pronounced by the courts from In re
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 7 and thereafter: that authorization to

64. Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1940).
65. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
66. In re City of Columbia Falls, Special Improvement Dist. No. 25, 143 B.R. 750
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
67. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
68. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
69. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262
(E.D. Cal. 2010).
70. In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
71. In re City of Stockton, 475 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
72. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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file a municipal bankruptcy is consent to all of what is in today’s Chapter
9.73
Scrutiny of Mission Independent School District reveals several
factors not considered in these courts’ rulings espousing their views on the
scope of consent. One is that Mission was decided in the context of the
same four self-contained sections that Bekins considered. Another is that
Mission dealt with the issue of whether a Texas statute authorizing the
filing of a municipal bankruptcy could also set the priority of payment of
certain creditors ahead of others in disregard of what the Bankruptcy Act
set as the priorities in Chapter IX. Third, the provisions for confirmation in
section 83(e) of the Bankruptcy Act set the confirmation requirements to
include “fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors and does
not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.”74
Fourth, section 83(b) of the 1937 Act mandated “[t]hat the holders of all
claims, regardless of the manner in which they are evidenced, which are
payable without preference out of funds derived from the same source or
sources shall be one class.”75 Lastly, most of the discussion in Mission
entailed the invalidity of the Texas authorizing statute under Texas’s state
constitution, which raises the specter that the bankruptcy law discussion
may be viewed as dicta.
For this discussion, the most important aspect is that Mission was
decided within the ambit of the limited provision then in Chapter IX, not
the myriad of those that have been incorporated into today’s law via
§§ 901(a) and 103(f). All that was addressed involved the classification
and confirmation criteria of the version of Chapter IX that the Bekins Court
had reviewed, not the numerous and sundry provisions that are in today’s
law that were not before the Mission Court.
Added to these is the basis on how the current view of consent was
arrived at and articulated in Sanitary & Improvement District, City of
Columbia Falls, County of Orange, City of Vallejo, City of Stockton, and
City of Detroit, in reliance on Mission. In their analysis of the contested
provisions, these courts did not mention, let alone use, the Bekins standard
for consent in the Tenth Amendment context, which is that the statutory
provision(s) under review may not impair a state’s sovereign powers.
Rather, each of these cases use wording with identical import. It is that
states which have authorized a municipal entity to file Chapter 9 which
have, as part of the authorization or other law, language that, in practical

73. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 975–76 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1989).
74. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658.
75. Id. § 83(b), 50 Stat. at 657 (emphasis added).
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effect, prevents a municipal debtor from adjusting debt is contrary to
Congress’s intent for adopting the laws regulating municipal bankruptcies.
As the court stated more simply in County of Orange, a state “must accept
[C]hapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it likes while
disregarding the rest.”76 All of this is another reason for why the current
position held by many on consent that purportedly flows from Bekins is too
far of an extrapolation. This is especially poignant when one knows that it
occurred in cases that did not entail full consideration of the factors
involved in making such an extrapolation.
IV. THREE FURTHER COMPLEXITIES: CASE LAW, IMPAIRMENT, AND
SOVEREIGNTY
Although already complex, there are three areas of law that need
mentioning, each of which, standing alone, presents ambiguities. When
added to the municipal bankruptcy scope of consent envisioned by the
Bekins Court, these ambiguities highlight perplexing and troublesome
issues that are left unresolved under existing Supreme Court precedent.
One issue is how to determine the type of state activity or function
that is shielded by the Tenth Amendment from the exercise of powers
granted to the United States by the states under the Constitution. Prior to
New York v. United States,77 a simple rule was used to differentiate
between state activities or functions upon which the United States could
exercise its various constitutional grants of powers and those with respect
to which it could not. They could not be exercised with respect to
governmental activities, but could be imposed on the proprietary or
business activities of a state. This standard was abandoned in New York as
being unworkable in the evolving world that saw states undertaking as their
functions activities that previously had only been done by the private
sector. What was tried next was use of a standard looking to the usual
traditional and essential governmental functions to differentiate those state
actions on which the United States could impose its constitutionally
founded powers on state functions and activities.
This criterion proved equally unavailing when it came to
differentiating which state functions and actions were subject to the
application of federal law. Next was National League of Cities v. Usery,78
which was a basis for an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act and which used

76. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
77. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
78. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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the differentiating standard of areas of traditional governmental function
such as fire and police protection, sanitation and public health, and parks
and recreation. This measuring criterion was thrown out in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.79
Somewhat of a quandary is that the Garcia Court rejected the
adoption of a specific rule of state immunity from federal regulation that
turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular function or activity of a
state is integral or traditional because it prevents a court from
accommodating changes in the historical functions of states which have
resulted in a number of formerly private functions, such as education, being
assumed by the states or their subdivisions. The Garcia Court’s refusal to
adopt a specific standard for when federal power may be imposed on state
functions and activities leaves us with no definitive, articulated factors
upon which one may flesh out whether any of the sections of Chapter 9 in
the Bekins consent formulation impair a state’s sovereignty beyond what
Bekins determined was acceptable.
New York v. United States involved the Taxation Clause, and National
League of Cities and Garcia revolved around the Commerce Clause.
Bekins involved the Bankruptcy Clause. Each of these cases involved
clauses in Article I, Section Eight, of the United States Constitution.80
Each of these cases also involved considerations of sovereignty and the
imposition of federal power on actions by a state. For these reasons, New
York, National League of Cities, and Garcia may assist, to a limited degree,
in fleshing out whether and what provisions of Chapter 9 under the Bekins
consent view either impair or do not impair the sovereign powers of a state.
At the same time, New York, National League of Cities, and Garcia
create a problem. Embedded in the Court’s analysis in these three cases is
the case-law-developed concept of intergovernmental immunity, which, as
will be mentioned, involves sovereignty, but is different from sovereignty.
These are major complexities that remain unresolved.
Added to this complexity is the Supreme Court’s holding in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz.81 In Central Virginia Community
College, the Supreme Court dealt with not just the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the context of a proceeding to recover a preferential transfer
from a college that was viewed as a subpart of the State of Virginia.82
Despite the extensive discussion of immunity—particularly sovereign
immunity—the Court did not rest its decision on a waiver of sovereign

79.
80.
81.
82.

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Id. at 360.
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immunity. Rather, the Court focused on whether Congress could subject
states to certain bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy Clause
granted power to enact “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,” which
involved a private person or entity as the debtor.83 It was based on the
Bankruptcy Clause powers superseding sovereign immunity.
Thus, it was not a decision on the full scope of sovereignty, which
needs to be distinguished from sovereign immunity and that of the Tenth
Amendment. Likewise, it was not a case dealing with the scope of consent
of a state to its subdivision filing a Chapter 9 case. That is, a case where
the debtor is a subdivision of the state. Just how broad the Bankruptcy
Clause powers of Congress are regarding the implications of a state’s
consent to the filing of a Chapter 9 as perceived by the Bekins court is not
resolved by Central Virginia Community College. In its most basic sense,
Central Virginia Community College is the Bankruptcy Clause’s
overpowering of sovereign immunity, not sovereignty and its Tenth
Amendment shield.
The second complication involves revisiting just what is impairment
of a contract by a state under the Contract Clause. There are at least three
categories for what is such an impairment.
I classify the first as the “absolutist view.” It is the predominant view
under case law, particularly that involving bankruptcies. Under this view,
any change in the amount to be paid back or altering of the other rights
under a contract, regardless of the time value of what is to be received, is
an impairment.
The second is one that I call the “economic view.” It is that leaving
all other factors unaltered, such as items like the collateral security, what is
the appropriate consideration is the present value of what is to be received
under the contract terms versus the present value of what is to be received
under the modified terms. If the value to be received under the modified
terms equals or exceeds that under the contract terms, there is no
impairment. If it does not, then there is impairment. The economic view is
part of the justification for why an extension of a contract is not a
composition and, as a result, does not result in the impairment of a contract.
However, some courts have begun to recognize that the extension case law
has only looked at part of the economic equation by focusing only on
continued payments at altered interest rates for a short term. As pointed
out in Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York,84 a long-enough delay in repayment
and/or a sufficient decrease in the interest rate will eventually become
enough of an alteration to impair a contract in the constitutional sense.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Ropico, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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The third conceptualization of impairment is the view espoused by
Justice Frankfurter in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park.85
This view may be referred to as the “realist view.” Essentially, this view
considers receipt of less than the face value of the payment provided for
under a contract as not constituting an impermissible impairment under the
Contract Clause, so long as what is received is equal to or greater than the
market value of the obligation at the time of the restructuring of the
indebtedness. Because of comments by the Supreme Court in United
States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,86 some view Faitoute as an
outlier that has no persuasive value. However, it should not be so casually
disregarded.
Both the Ropico and Faitoute opinions have independently
incorporated into the legal analysis something that, over time, the Supreme
Court has done with its views on the exercise of federal power over state
functions and activities: the process of what is a sovereign activity of a
state is not static and should not be viewed as such. Similarly, the
evolution of the bankruptcy law has not been and should not be static.
What has become more important over time is not artificial and rigid
designations for terms like “impairment.” What is critical is the reality of
the situation. Under either the economic view or Justice Frankfurter’s
realist view, the analysis is whether what you receive is equal to or better
than what one would receive under the terms of an unaltered obligation.
Should either conceptualization of impairment become the accepted view
on impairment, the entire realm of municipal debt adjustment will be
altered. In fact, it may obviate the need for a municipal bankruptcy in
some cases.
The last of the three complexities is recognition that sovereignty is not
identical to sovereign immunity. It is accurate that sovereign immunity
involves sovereignty considerations. However, it does not define the set of
factors that constitute sovereignty. At best, sovereign immunity is a set of
factors that may be seen as either partially intersecting the set of
sovereignty or as a subset of sovereignty. It does not fully occupy the
global set that is sovereignty. Thus, the case law that looks at immunity of
states from the imposition of federal laws on their activities should not be
seen as necessarily considering factors identical to those of the Supreme
Court in Bekins concerning sovereignty in its Tenth Amendment context.
Some will be the same, but not all. This becomes more significant when
one knows that certain subdivisions of states, such as counties, cities, and
others are generally, not necessarily always, viewed under case law as

85. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
86. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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lacking the sovereign characteristics with which the states of the United
States are endowed. This is the rest of why the Supreme Court’s and lower
federal courts’ opinions present obstacles to evaluating the sovereignty
factors of importance in Bekins: they often do not distinguish between
sovereignty and immunity, including sovereign immunity, as part of their
analysis of the ability of the federal government to impose its laws on state
functions and activities.
CONCLUSION
The espousal of some that a state’s authorization of its subdivisions to
file a municipal bankruptcy case equates to it and others not being able to
avoid application of all sections of the Bankruptcy Code that are part of
Chapter 9 is an overstatement of what Bekins viewed as consent by a state
in aid of its sovereign powers. No court opinions that recite what I call the
“no cherry pick” rule involved much, let alone a full, consideration of the
structure and framing of the structure of the Constitution regarding the
perimeters of the ability of a state to consent to imposition of federal
bankruptcy powers over its municipal subdivisions. Nor do they discuss
the fact that the current municipal bankruptcy law’s provisions are far
broader in reach and impact on a state’s exercise of its sovereign powers
than those in the 1937 Act, or recognize that its limited provisions
contained in only four sections were directly relevant to and were an
integral part of the Bekins ruling. This current view of consent by many is,
at a minimum, generalized dicta accorded far too great a significance. It is
most likely incorrect regarding some of what are the fringes of the
provisions of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which were never, and
could not have been, part of the Supreme Court’s Bekins analysis.
A more correct and limited view of the Bekins holding regarding
consent by a state to its subdivisions filing a municipal bankruptcy case is
that it supports such a filing under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and it
remains to be seen how much of what has been added to the municipal
bankruptcy law may be objected to by a state, its municipality in
bankruptcy, and others such as creditors and parties in interest. The
conclusion is that the absolute nature of the so-called “no cherry pick” rule
is unsupported by a critical analysis of the constitutional structure
regarding sovereignty, the Bekins holding, and the context in which Bekins
was decided. Accordingly, this view on consent should be relegated to the
realm of nothingness! Paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter, “the dictum . . . is
one of those inaccurate generalizations that ha[s] gained momentum from
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uncritical repetition.”87 What remains to be done by the courts is the
fleshing out of the boundaries of consent of a state set by the Constitution,
including its applicable amendments, done in the context of the analytical
steps used by the Bekins Court, conjoined with consideration of the bundle
of facts unique to each case.

87. Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 513.
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